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REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF
JERUSALEM*
Samuel W. Lewis**
The devilishly complex problem of Jerusalem incorporates a witches'
brew of history, legal theories, clashing religious beliefs, diplomatic legacies of bloodshed, and colonial rule. The term, "City of Peace," often
applied so hopefully to this unique place, all too often throughout history
has been a bitter mockery of reality. Yet, that phrase correctly identifies
Jerusalem as the necessary keystone for any truly lasting, comprehensive
peace between Arabs and Jews.
I am not a lawyer. I acquired a good deal of my knowledge of international law through "on-the-job training" during my eight years as United
States Ambassador to Israel. That experience confirmed the truth of Professor Ruth Lapidoth's observation that "basically, the Jerusalem question is of a political nature, and I ...doubt how much law can contribute
to the solution."1 Indeed, if diplomats and politicians could only place
the word, "sovereignty," in a deep freeze somewhere for several decades,
a workable and politically acceptable arrangement for the Holy City
would become infinitely more achievable.
The clash of religious claims remains the simplest part of the Gordian
knot to unravel. Nearly all parties agree in principle to the need to assure
free access to the Holy Places and effective control over those shrines by
the respective religious authorities. Of course, often bitter rivalries
within Christendom over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and between
* Adapted from a speech given at a symposium entitled, "Jerusalem: Dimensions of
a Unique City," held in conjunction with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies at the
Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America on October 24, 1995.
** The author served as United States Ambassador to Israel from 1977-1985. He also
has served as Director of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff (1993-1994), Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Senior Staff Member for the
National Security Council, Member of the United States Agency for International Development mission to Brazil, and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State. He is
currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Middle East Institute, the
American Academy of Diplomacy, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and numerous other foreign
policy, environmental, and public affairs organizations.
1. Ruth Lapidoth, Symposium, Jerusalem: Dimensions of a Unique City, at 12 (Oct.
24, 1995) (transcript on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
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rival Muslim monarchs for primacy in safeguarding Al Aqsa and the
Dome of the Rock, can complicate matters but surely are surmountable.
Even the suggestion by Ambassador Adnan Abu Odeh that a council of
three religious authorities might actually administer the one square kilometer walled City, without any national flags overhead, does not seem
unrealistic-if the more vexing political issues were somehow resolved.2
Nor does a workable formula for maintaining a physically unified city
while granting substantial self-governing authority to its Jewish and Arab
quarters loom as insurmountable. Former Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy
Kollek's long-standing proposals for a "borough system" is only one of
many possible administrative variants which are now finally the subject of
serious discussion in private, non-official "Track II" dialogues between
influential Israelis and Palestinians.
The central question will remain how to satisfy the symbolic demand of
the Palestinian National Authority to establish its political capital in Al
Quds. The capital of Israel is, and will certainly remain, Yerushalaim.
This is now an uncontestable fact of history, regardless of the diplomatic
hair-splitting which continues to preoccupy many foreign ministries, unfortunately including our own.
In that regard, official United States policy and diplomatic practice
have evolved steadily if sometimes imperceptibly since the 1950s, when
the United States Ambassador in Tel Aviv had to beg permission from
the United States Consul General in Jerusalem to enter "his city" in order to visit Israel's Foreign Ministry. And even then, he could not fly the
American flag on his official car within the city limits of Jerusalem for
fear of symbolically acknowledging Israeli sovereignty over the western
part of the city then under Israeli control. Since the physical reunification
of Jerusalem in the 1967 war, practice has evolved slowly despite much
opposition and hesitation. American diplomats from Tel Aviv move
freely about the western part of Jerusalem in tacit, de facto recognition
that Israel's capital resides in Jerusalem. Yet, as Professor Lapidoth has
noted, the United States government still treats Israeli rule of East Jerusalem since the 1967 war as that of a "belligerent occupier." 3 The United
States has never recognized Israel's annexation of the eastern part of the
city. The diplomatic consequence of this distinction is that American officials may not conduct any official business at Israeli government offices in
East Jerusalem, nor may the Ambassador fly his flag when he goes into
that part of the city for private purposes.
2. Adnan Abu Odeh, Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem, 71
Spring 1992, at 183, 187.
3. See generally Lapidoth, supra note 1.
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These and other minor annoyances for years have stimulated supporters of Israel in Congress to seek formal legislation to mandate moving the
United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and to extend formal
recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's de jure capital. Concerns about jeopardizing the peace process repeatedly blocked these initiatives over the
years. Finally, however, in late 1995, Congress adopted such a measure
with certain escape clauses for the President with respect to the timing of
the Embassy move.4 As I had long been convinced, the passage of this
law, while offensive to many Arabs, created no real turbulence in the
ongoing peace process with Syria and the Palestinians.
One of my dubious pleasures between 1977 and 1985 as Ambassador
was to travel over the road connecting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem more than
five thousand times. It was, and remains, an inconvenience. But the issue
of the location of the United States Embassy had been blown out of all
proportion for years by United States domestic political winds. It is undoubtedly better for all concerned to remove it from the negotiating table, but it remains inconsequential to the question of Jerusalem's future.
We selected the site of our new Embassy, in West Jerusalem on the road
to Bethlehem, long ago. Therefore, the move, whenever it finally occurs,
will have no automatic effect on United States diplomatic practice toward
East Jerusalem.
United States policy toward the broader question of Jerusalem's future
has hewed stubbornly for decades to three principles: free access to the
Holy Places; no new physical division of the city; and the parties must
settle the final status in negotiation. The United States undoubtedly will
cling tenaciously to these principles in whatever supporting role our diplomats may play in future negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians
or other Arabs over the final status and contours of Jerusalem. If the
United States intervenes openly in proposing a solution, it grasps the
"third rail" of the Arab-Israel peace process without insulation. No present or future United States President is likely to take such a risk.
I anticipate that the upcoming "final status negotiations" may last for
several years. Meanwhile, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority
will cautiously develop and test their new "interim arrangements" set up
under the Oslo II Agreement.5 Functional ties between the autonomous
Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem will expand. If security threats are contained effectively, and if eco4. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, 109 Stat. 398 (1995).
5. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(signed by the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO on Sept. 28, 1995 in Washington, D.C.).
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nomic and social coexistence develops between the two societies, then
some years hence it may even be possible to negotiate a "two capital"
formula that can satisfy Palestinian nationalist aspirations without undermining "Israel's eternal, undivided capital." Even Ambassador Abu
Odeh's vision might be possible.6 But, at this delicate stage in the overall
process of seeking a comprehensive Arab-Israel peace, no Israeli political
leader could survive his sponsorship of such a proposal. It would be delusional to believe that we can achieve any mutually accepted formula for
Jerusalem in the near future.

6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing proposal of Adnan Abu
Odeh).

